É a tradução de European Mechanism for Sovereign Debt Crisis Resolution (EMSDR) proposto pelo think tank Bruegel que visa reduzir os problemas de risco moral e equilibrar os interesses dos devedores e credores que incluiria dois pilares:
- A procedure to initiate and conduct negotiations between a sovereign debtor with unsustainable debt and its creditors leading to, and enforcing, an agreement on how to reduce the present value of the debtor’s future obligations in order to re-establish the sustainability of its public finances. This would require a special court to deal with such cases. The European Court of Justice is the natural institution for this purpose and a special chamber could be created within it for that purpose.
- Rules for the provision of financial assistance to euro-area countries as an element in resolving the crisis. Should a euro-area country be found insolvent, the provision of financial aid should be conditional on the achievement of an agreement between the debtor and the creditors reestablishing solvency. The task of supplying financial assistance could be given to the EFSF provided that it is made permanent and an institution of the European Union. Lending by the permanent EFSF could also be provided, under appropriate conditions, to euro area countries facing temporary liquidity problems, as currently foreseen by the temporary EFSF.
Esta proposta surge na sequência da declaração franco-germânica de Deauville de que o Presidente do BCE se demarcou ao recordar que "The IMF does not make necessarily the ex-ante working assumption that the relationship with markets, investors and savers is interrupted. It can be, but it is not the ex-ante compulsory assumption. (...) Of course, it can never be excluded, but this assumption is not made as compulsory ex ante. I would say the assumption made is the contrary." e que tem suscitado várias críticas sendo apontado como um dos factores que conduziu ao recente aumento dos yields das dívidas públicas grega, irlandesa e portuguesa. Sendo a este respeito é curioso notar que na proposta agora apresentada se refere que "The creation of the ECRM would likely need to be established by a treaty. The mechanism would, therefore, only apply to future debt issuance."
A leitura deste documento vale a pena naõ só pela actualidade e importância do tema mas também pelo enquadramento que faz da questão, que revela, por um lado, os argumentos favoráveis à sua criação (que são convincentes) e, por outro, as dificuldades para a sua implementação (que são consideráveis).
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