Opções para um roll-over da dívida grega

Chamo a atenção para um post do Aphaville em que citanmdo um analista do banco Nomura aponta três alternativas possíveis para um roll-over da dívida grega:

"(1) bond maturity extensions, which almost certainly would result in default or selective default as viewed by rating agencies (if not for CDS) and is thus a clearly negative outcome leading to contagion in the rest of the periphery and the banking system in Europe;
(2) rollovers into GGBs (or any loan to Greece) negotiated with some of the largest GGB holders (so called “Vienna option”) which are a soft way of extending maturities, potentially avoiding a default as viewed by rating agencies and positive for the periphery in the short term to the extent that a default and the contagion effect are avoided for now;
(3) voluntary rollovers into debt that has better credit than GGBs, ideally EFSF bonds (a European version of the Brady bonds) if not enhanced GGBs, which would be very positive because it is the closest thing to a durable solution to the problem (GGBs are removed from the circulation and the new debt is guaranteed by the rest of Europe) while it should considerably limit the risk of a default rating.

The first outcome seems to be no longer be an option since the press conference on Friday. The second is likely, but a form of guarantee/collateral on the new debt, as would be necessary in option 3, has not yet been openly debated and would need to be considered if avoiding [default/contagion] is the objective. If it is part of the package, it would be an important positive surprise for periphery bonds."

Note-se, no entanto, que os Brady Bonds correspondiam a uma reestruturação da dívida através da troca por títulos com menor valor de reembolso ou menor taxa de juro o que tornará incerta a adesão "voluntária" à solução. Uma adesão que significaria sempre que os credores consideram muito provável um cenário de incumprimento, preferindo por isso trocar por a dívida que detêm por títulos com menor valor actual mas com garantia de reembolso, transfere de facto o risco de incumprimento da Grécia para os contribuintes europeia e não garante as condições para o regresso da Grécia ao mercado após o novo prazo.